28 CFR 16.82: Exemption of the National Drug Intelligence Center Data Base--limited access.
(a) The following system of records is exempted pursuant to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) from subsections (c) (3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (2), and (3); (e)(4)(I); (e) (5) and (8); and (g) of 5 U.S.C. 552a. In addition, the following system of records is exempted pursuant to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a (k)(1) and (k)(2) from subsections (c)(3), (d), and (e)(1) and (e)(4)(I) of 5 U.S.C. 552a:
(1) National Drug Intelligence Center Data Base (JUSTICE/NDIC-001).
(b) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement process, and/or where it may be appropriate to permit individuals to contest the accuracy of the information collected, e.g., public source materials, the applicable exemption may be waived, either partially or totally, by the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:
(1) From subsection (c)(3) for the same reasons that the system is exempted from the provisions of subsection (d).
(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsection (j)(2) of the Privacy Act.
(3) From subsection (d) because disclosure to the subject could alert the subject of an investigation pertaining to narcotic trafficking or related activity of the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or of the investigative interest of NDIC and other intelligence or law enforcement agencies (including those responsible for civil proceedings related to laws against drug trafficking); lead to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; reveal the details of a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique, or the identity of a confidential source; or otherwise impede, compromise, or interfere with investigative efforts and other related law enforcement and/or intelligence activities. In addition, disclosure could invade the privacy of third parties and/or endanger the life and safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, witnesses, and potential crime victims. Finally, access to records could result in the release of properly classified information that could compromise the national defense or foreign policy. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.
(4) From subsection (e)(1) because, in the course of its acquisition, collation, and analysis of information, NDIC will need to retain information not immediately shown to be relevant to counterdrug law enforcement to establish patterns of activity and to assist other agencies charged with the enforcement of laws and regulations regarding drug trafficking and charged with the acquisition of intelligence related to international aspects of drug trafficking. This consideration applies equally to information acquired from, or collated or analyzed for, both law enforcement agencies and agencies of the U.S. foreign intelligence community.
(5) From subsection (e)(2) because application of this provision could present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it would put the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of the fact of such investigation, study, or analysis, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct intended to frustrate the activity; because, in some circumstances, the subject of an investigation may not be required to provide to investigators certain information; and because thorough analysis and investigation may require seeking information from a number of different sources.
(6) From subsection (e)(3) (to the extent applicable) because the requirement that individuals supplying information be provided a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation and reveal the identity of confidential informants and endanger their lives and safety.
(7) From subsection (e)(4)(I), to the extent that this subsection is interpreted to require more detail regarding the record sources in this system than have been published in the Federal Register.
Should the subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is necessary to protect the confidentiality of the sources of criminal and other law enforcement information and to protect the privacy and physical safety of witnesses and informants. Furthermore, greater specificity concerning the sources of properly classified records could compromise national defense or foreign policy.
(8) From subsection (e)(5) because the acquisition, collation, and analysis of information for law enforcement purposes does not permit advance determination whether such information is accurate or relevant, nor can such information be limited to that which is complete or apparently timely. Information of this type often requires further analysis and investigation to develop into a comprehensive whole that which is otherwise incomplete or even fragmentary. Moreover, its accuracy is continually subject to analysis and review, and, upon careful examination, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire added significance as additional information brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in collating and analyzing information and would impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.
(9) From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirements of subsection (e)(8) could present a serious impediment to law enforcement by revealing investigative techniques, procedures, or evidence.
(10) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from subsection (d).
[Order No. 78-93, 58 FR 41038, Aug. 2, 1993]